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12 April 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nasir's visit to India accomplishes little. ①

Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana attempting to establish influence with African leaders in the Belgian Congo, which becomes independent on 30 June. ②


## III. THE WEST

French defense minister expresses concern over establishment of FLN training camps in Tunisia near Algerian border. ③

Italian President Gronchi expected to make another attempt at a center-left government. ④

## LATE ITEM

Ayub makes closest associate governor of East Pakistan. ⑤



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

12 April 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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OK  
[redacted] India-UAR: Nasir's 13-day visit to India had only a moderate impact on the Indian public and did little to advance his prestige in South Asia. The communiqué issued by Nasir and Nehru on 10 April, reflecting agreement on most international issues, contained the standard references to nonalignment, cessation of nuclear testing, and relaxation of world tensions. [Nehru [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] maneuvered by Nasir into a public commitment to visit the UAR in mid-May on his way home from the Commonwealth prime ministers' conference. [redacted] 25X1

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NO  
Ghana - Belgian Congo: (Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana is stepping up efforts to establish his influence among African leaders in the Belgian Congo, where general elections are to be held before the Congo becomes independent on 30 June. Principal recipient of Nkrumah's attentions is Patrice Lumumba, the opportunistic head of one wing of the important Congo National Movement. Nkrumah apparently believes that Lumumba, who has been associated with the Accra-based All-African People's Conference since its establishment in 1958, would support Congo participation in the "union" of African states which the Ghanaian leader is trying to promote.) [redacted] 25X1

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#### III. THE WEST

OK  
France - North Africa: Defense Minister Messmer reported to the French Senate's Defense Committee on 6 April his concern over Tunisian "complicity" in allowing the

installation of rebel training camps "within binocular range" of the Algerian frontier. He said that French military forces are not authorized to remedy the situation "for the time being." Should a rumored rebel offensive in the border area materialize, there is a possibility of serious incidents. [redacted] (Page 3)

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OK  
Italy: Following yesterday's resignation of Christian Democratic Premier-designate Tambroni, whose party refused to let him depend on neo-Fascist parliamentary votes, President Gronchi will probably make another attempt at a center-left formula. He may, however, be forced to fall back on protracted one-party caretaker government. All parties seem to prefer delaying national elections until at least the spring of 1961. [redacted] (Page 4)

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## LATE ITEM

25X1 [redacted] \*Pakistan: The appointment on 11 April of Food Minister Lt. Gen. Azam Khan as governor of East Pakistan puts President Ayub's right-hand man in charge of the country's most populous province and demonstrates the central government's concern over East Pakistan. Azam, who has a reputation for getting things done, will probably seek quick economic improvement. The East Pakistanis, however, may resent control of their province by an outsider. Azam's departure from Rawalpindi will create a power vacuum in President Ayub's cabinet and could lead to a cabinet reshuffle. Ambitious Interior Minister Sheikh may make a strong bid for greater influence. [redacted] (Page 5)

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Nkrumah Intensifying Support of Congolese Political Leader

Ghana's ambitious Prime Minister Nkrumah is stepping up efforts to establish his influence among African leaders in the Belgian Congo where general national and provincial elections are to be held before the Congo becomes independent on 30 June. The principal individual target of these efforts is Patrice Lumumba, who has emerged as one of the Congo's most influential leaders and who has reportedly received assistance from a variety of sources including the Soviet bloc, the UAR, and certain Belgian financial interests. Lumumba has been on the steering committee of the Accra-based All-African People's Conference since it was founded in December 1958 and appears to be oriented toward Nkrumah's brand of militant pan-Africanism.]

Last week Nkrumah--apparently with the full cooperation of Belgian officials--sent a special delegation headed by Ghana's Foreign Minister Adjei to Leopoldville to "get acquainted" and meet Congolese political leaders. During this visit Adjei publicly stated that Ghana favored Lumumba because of his support of pan-Africanism. [REDACTED]

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Nkrumah's immediate object--and one which he has evidently coordinated with the Belgians--apparently is to persuade Congolese politicians to retain Belgian civil servants for the time being.]

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rather than to risk creating a vacuum into which other non-Africans or Africans friendly to France might move. Such a development would further impede Nkrumah's increasing efforts to promote the early establishment of a real political union among African states. Developments in Guinea and Cameroun and the prospects in several soon-to-be independent African states have so far frustrated the Ghanaian leader's hopes that all emerging Black African countries would look to him for leadership in creating such a union.

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### III. THE WEST

#### Possibility of New Incidents in Algeria-Tunisia Border Area

Defense Minister Messmer, speaking before the French Senate's Defense Committee on 6 April, again accused the Tunisian Government of "complicity" in allowing the FLN rebels to build training camps close to the Algerian-Tunisian border. French military authorities expect a rebel attack in force at an early date, and they have already reported some shelling from across the border. Army headquarters in Algeria last week announced the withdrawal of the seasoned Tenth Paratroop Division from the Kabylia Mountain area for transfer to another fighting area, probably the Tunisian border, after a short period of rest.

Messmer said that French military forces "for the time being" are not authorized to remedy the situation arising from the rebel safe-havens in Tunisia. The French press is giving considerable play to the "right of pursuit" question, however, and should the rebels launch an offensive there is a possibility of serious incidents. The French have crossed the Tunisian border occasionally in the past, and the bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef in February 1958 occasioned a formal Tunisian complaint to the UN Security Council.

French-Tunisian relations, frequently strained by Tunisia's hypersensitivity regarding all prerogatives arising from independence as well as by the Algerian rebellion, were characterized by the French chargé in Tunis on 9 April as "never worse than today." The future status of the Bizerte base is the chief point at issue. President Bourguiba insists that the French must eventually give up the base, though he now appears prepared to postpone new agitation until October when he can assess the results of Paris' new program to consolidate French naval and air forces inside the base perimeter. Any earlier resumption of Tunisian pressure on the Bizerte issue could provoke Paris to give French field commanders in Algeria a freer hand in the border area. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]



### The Italian Cabinet Crisis


The resignation of the Tambroni cabinet, brought about by the refusal of the Christian Democratic party to depend on neo-Fascists for a parliamentary majority revives the party's long-standing dilemma. Seeking support from the right would defy the generally leftward trend at the polls, while a move to the left would risk alienating significant conservative ecclesiastical and economic interests inside or allied with the party.

In the course of the six-week-old crisis, one unsuccessful attempt has already been made to install a center-left cabinet. Nevertheless, President Gronchi, a strong proponent of the center-left formula, will probably favor a second attempt. The next most likely alternative is a government drawing support from the Liberals and Monarchists. The Liberals--who caused the crisis by refusing to go on supporting the Segni government without being represented in the cabinet--presumably would demand inclusion in a coalition government. This is a conceivable solution, but not a likely one in the face of opposition from left-wing Christian Democrats.


Gronchi may be forced to fall back on protracted one-party caretaker government. All parties seem to prefer delaying elections until the spring of 1961. [REDACTED]

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## LATE ITEM

Pakistani Food Minister Azam Khan Appointed Governor  
Of East Pakistan

The appointment on 11 April of Food Minister Lt. Gen. Azam Khan as governor of East Pakistan puts President Ayub's right-hand man in charge of the country's most populous province and may be intended to demonstrate that the central government views progress in East Pakistan as a priority objective. Azam, who has a reputation for getting things done, will probably try to bring about early economic improvement.

Since Azam, a West Pakistani, replaces an East Pakistani as governor of East Pakistan, Ayub may appoint a minister from that province to his cabinet to maintain the number of East Pakistanis holding high office. Such a gesture, however, would be unlikely to satisfy the East Pakistanis, coming on the heels of the replacement in early April of a martial-law administrator who had become popular, by a West Pakistani who to them is an unknown quantity. In addition to being an outsider, Azam in his drive for greater efficiency and harder work may offend provincial sensitivities.

Azam's departure will bring the first change in the membership in Ayub's cabinet since the October 1958 takeover by the army. The new governor may view his departure from the central government and from army headquarters, both of which are located in Rawalpindi, as a demotion since it removes him from the center of power. With the departure of the second most important cabinet member after President Ayub, the other members are likely to jockey for positions of greater influence, with Minister of Interior Sheikh taking a prominent part in the maneuvering. [Sheikh has been frequently mentioned in rumors circulated by opponents of the regime as eager to increase his own power even at the expense of President Ayub.]

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